Faster via Suez, Heavier on Capacity: How LSPs Should Plan for the Red Sea “Trial Phase”

For most of 2024 and 2025, the rule on long-haul East–West trades was simple: avoid the Red Sea, go around the Cape of Good Hope. That meant longer voyages, higher costs, and a large chunk of effective capacity tied up on extended routes.

Now the picture is more complicated.

One major carrier has completed a first test voyage through the Red Sea and Suez, explicitly describing its strategy as a “stepwise” return.
Another has sent ultra-large container ships back through the canal and announced that key services will resume routing via Suez from early 2026.
War-risk premiums are falling, incidents have paused under a fragile ceasefire, and Suez transits are slowly rising again—still below pre-crisis levels, but no longer near zero.

We’re no longer in “everyone detours via the Cape” mode. We’re in a trial phase: some services via Suez, some via Cape, with carriers testing how fast and how far they are willing to return.

For logistics service providers (LSPs), this phase is a double-edged sword:

Faster via Suez: Transit times improve, reliability can recover, fuel burn drops.
Heavier on capacity: As voyages shorten, the same fleet can complete more round trips, gradually releasing effective capacity back into the market.

This post looks at:

What the “Suez trial phase” actually is
How it changes transit times and effective capacity
What this implies for rates (without making fragile predictions)
How LSPs should think about contracts, lead times, and visibility in the next 3–6 months

1. What the “Suez Trial Phase” Actually Looks Like

For now, there is no single “Red Sea is solved” moment. Instead, we see:

Test transits:
A major East–West carrier has run a first controlled voyage through the Red Sea and Suez with a mid-size vessel, publicly emphasising that this does not mean a full reopening of all services. Their wording is cautious: a stepwise, safety-first review, with further transits depending on security conditions.
More assertive returns:
One of the largest European carriers has already sent its flagship ultra-large container ships back through Suez after a two-year absence and has scheduled key services (for example, India–US and Europe–Asia loops) to route via the canal again from early 2026.
Carrier-by-carrier differences:
Some operators are moving faster, while others—particularly those that experienced direct disruption earlier—are slower to change. Each is making its own call on risk tolerance.

At a network level, the pattern looks like this:

Some strings revert to Suez routing now.
Others remain on the Cape while carriers watch how security, insurance, and competitor behaviour evolve.
Schedules and service maps are adjusted incrementally rather than rewritten overnight.

For LSPs, the key takeaway is:

There will be months where Cape and Suez routes coexist on the same corridors. The transition will be uneven and reversible, not a clean flip back to “old normal”.

2. Capacity Math: Why Suez Return Is a Double-Edged Sword

Detouring via the Cape of Good Hope did two things at once:

Extended voyage times
Many Asia–Europe and related legs added around 10 days or more versus normal Suez routing, depending on speed and ports of call.
Soaked up effective capacity
Longer round trips mean each ship completes fewer voyages per year. Several independent analyses have estimated that these diversions absorbed on the order of 6–9% of global effective container capacity, even though the nominal fleet size did not change.

That “capacity soak” is one of the reasons rates did not collapse in 2024–2025 despite strong newbuilding deliveries: extra time at sea mopped up some of the surplus.

When services return to Suez, the logic runs in reverse:

Shorter routes mean more voyages per ship per year.
Over time, a large part of the 6–9% effective capacity loss comes back.
The fleet doesn’t grow overnight, but its productivity does.

This is why Suez reopening is a double-edged sword for the market:

Positive edge for shippers and LSPs:
Faster transit, better schedule stability (once the transition settles), lower bunker and charter costs per move.
Negative edge for rate levels:
More effective capacity chasing broadly similar demand, unless carriers continue to offset it with blank sailings and other capacity management tools.

The key word here is “over time”. Capacity does not suddenly jump by 7–10% the moment one carrier announces a test transit. It returns gradually, loop by loop, as routings and rotations change.

3. What Changes for Transit Times (and When)

The immediate impact of a Suez return is straightforward at the voyage level:

A service that switches from Cape back to Suez can save roughly 10–14 days on a typical Asia–North Europe leg.
On India–US and other Suez-dependent corridors, savings will vary by port pair but are still material.

But at the planning level, it’s more nuanced.

Short Term: Mixed Portfolio

In the next few months, LSPs are likely to have:

Some services still running via Cape, with longer and more variable transit times.
Some services back on Suez, with faster transits but still adjusting as networks are tweaked.
Occasional mid-stream adjustments as carriers test new routings and respond to any changes in the security environment.

From a customer’s perspective, the question, “How long does Asia–Europe take now?” no longer has a single answer. It depends on:

The carrier and service they’re on
Whether that loop has switched back to Suez
Whether the switch is stable or still in flux

Medium Term: Gradual Reversion Toward Pre-Crisis Ranges

If the security situation holds and carriers maintain or expand Suez usage:

Average transit times on key East–West lanes should gradually drift back toward pre-crisis ranges, though they may not fully match the most optimistic historic numbers.
Schedule reliability usually lags routing changes; services need time to settle into new rotations without constant tweaks.

For LSPs, that means:

Treat early Suez announcements as signals to watch, not immediate reasons to revert your lead-time assumptions to 2022.

4. What This Could Mean for Rates (Without Guessing Exact Numbers)

It’s tempting to leap from “10–14 days faster” and “6–9% capacity released” straight to “massive rate collapse.” Reality is more conditional.

Forces That Push Rates Down

Capacity productivity increases as voyages shorten.
The “forced tightness” from Cape detours gradually disappears.
If demand growth remains modest, more effective capacity can mean greater downward pressure on spot rates, especially on Asia–Europe and related trades.

Forces That Support or Hold Rates Up

Carriers still have levers:
- Blank sailings and slow steaming can re-tighten effective capacity.
- Services can be merged or rationalised rather than simply returning all capacity to the original routings.
Security and insurance:
- War-risk premiums may not drop to zero overnight.
- Some carriers may factor ongoing risk into their pricing, even with Suez back in use.
Demand is uncertain:
- Tariff policy, regional growth, and inventory behaviour will all influence how much capacity feels “excessive” or “adequate.”

Scenario Thinking Instead of Forecasts

For LSPs, it’s more useful to think in scenarios:

Scenario 1: Gradual Suez normalisation + continued blanking
Spot rates soften from current peaks but don’t collapse; contracts remain valuable, especially on time-sensitive lanes.
Scenario 2: Faster Suez normalisation + weaker demand + less discipline
A more noticeable easing in spot rates, particularly on commoditised corridors, with contract holders asking whether they are overpaying.
Scenario 3: Security setback
Partial return to Cape routing, renewed pressure on capacity, and another period of volatility and elevated rates.

You don’t control which scenario happens. You can control whether your procurement and customer strategy can survive more than one.

5. Contracts vs Spot: How to Position Yourself

With the market in transition, long, inflexible commitments in either direction carry risk.

For Existing Agreements

Review current contracts for:

Routing assumptions:
If transit-time commitments and rate structures implicitly assumed Cape routing, what happens when services switch to Suez? Will customers expect shorter transit at the same rate?
Flexibility for adjustment:
Do you have mechanisms to renegotiate or adjust terms if market levels move significantly due to capacity changes?

For New Agreements

Consider:

Shorter tenors or mid-year review points
Rather than locking into a full-year position at today’s uncertainty level, many LSPs will be better served with contracts that allow a structured check-in after 6 months.
A blended portfolio
- Base volumes secured on contracts to ensure stability.
- A deliberate portion left exposed to spot so you can benefit if rates ease as capacity returns.

The goal isn’t to “time the bottom.” It’s to avoid being trapped on the wrong side of a sharp move, whichever way it goes.

6. Planning Lead Times in a Mixed Cape/Suez World

Lead-time planning is where many logistics teams get in trouble—either by:

Staying stuck on “worst-case Cape” assumptions long after specific services have stabilised via Suez, or
Snapping back to pre-crisis “Suez normal” too quickly and overpromising.

A more robust approach is lane-specific.

Step 1: Define Two Baselines Per Lane

For each critical corridor (e.g., East China → North Europe, India → US East Coast):

Conservative baseline:
Based on recent actual performance with Cape routing and realistic port dwell.
Optimistic baseline:
Based on Suez routing on the services that have actually switched, with a buffer for network reshuffling.

Until you have consistent performance data, plan with the conservative baseline for critical flows, especially where missed windows have high cost.

Step 2: Monitor Actual Performance, Not Just Schedules

Schedules will change more often in a transition period. What matters is:

What your containers are actually experiencing
How many shipments are delivering within the promised windows
Where discrepancies cluster (specific carriers, services, ports)

Once you have several voyages’ worth of real data on a particular Suez-routed loop, you can safely narrow your planning buffers.

Step 3: Communicate the Lane-Level Reality

Internally:

Give sales and operations lane-specific guidance, not one global message like “Red Sea is over, so everything is faster now.”

Externally:

Explain to customers that:
- Some routes are improving already.
- Others will take longer.
- You are updating lead times based on actual performance, not just headlines.

That honesty often buys more trust than optimistic promises that slip.

7. Why Visibility and Data Integrity Matter Most in the Trial Phase

In a stable environment, you can sometimes get away with weekly snapshots and rough averages. In a mixed Cape/Suez world, that stops working.

The key operational risks are:

Routing changes mid-voyage
A ship originally planned for Cape is shifted to Suez (or vice versa), altering ETA by a week or more.
Service reconfigurations
Ports of call change, transshipment hubs are swapped, or calls are dropped as carriers rework rotations.
Container-level reassignments
Boxes are moved between vessels or services to rebalance networks.

If you depend on:

Daily spreadsheet uploads, or
Manual carrier portal checks,

you learn about these changes after they’ve already reshaped your lead times.

With an event-based visibility layer, you can see:

Vessel assignments and route segments at the shipment level
ETA changes tied directly to routing decisions
Transshipment events and dwell that deviate from normal patterns

That’s where TRADLINX fits:

B/L- and container-centric timelines that track every major event.
Frequent refresh from carriers, ports, and other data sources.
APIs and integrations that feed your TMS, ERP, or customer portal, so everyone sees the same current picture.

In a trial phase where routing can change voyage by voyage, having a single event backbone is the difference between:

Reacting to surprises you learn about from customers, and
Anticipating issues in time to adjust plans and expectations.

8. What LSPs Should Watch Over the Next 3–6 Months

To navigate this period deliberately, build a simple monitoring framework around three buckets:

8.1 Security and Policy

Are there new incidents or threats in the Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb corridor?
Are ceasefire and security arrangements holding?
How are insurers adjusting war-risk premiums?

Any deterioration here can slow or reverse Suez reopening.

8.2 Carrier and Capacity Behaviour

Which carriers expand Suez usage fastest on your key lanes?
Are blank sailings staying elevated to offset returning capacity?
Are new services being launched, merged, or suspended?

This determines how quickly capacity returns and how it is deployed.

8.3 Performance and Price

Actual transit times and schedule reliability on your main corridors.
Evolution of spot vs contract levels, especially on Asia–Europe and India–US trades.
Customer sensitivity to service vs price as conditions evolve.

Taken together, these indicators tell you whether the market is moving toward:

A softer, more competitive rate environment, or
A managed balance where discipline remains high despite more potential capacity.

Conclusion: Designing for a Moving Target

The Red Sea disruption pushed the industry into an extreme, Cape-dominated routing pattern that absorbed a meaningful chunk of effective capacity and lengthened every Asia–Europe voyage.

The next phase will not be a neat reversal. Instead, carriers are:

Testing Suez again in steps, service by service.
Bringing capacity back gradually, not all at once.
Balancing improved transit times with their own need to protect utilisation and rates.

For LSPs, the right posture is neither panic nor complacency:

Don’t assume “back to Suez” equals instant pre-crisis normality.
Don’t ignore the fact that shorter voyages will eventually loosen the capacity picture.
Design contracts, lead times, and customer communication around lane-specific data and event-level visibility, not generic narratives.

In other words: treat the Red Sea and Suez as a moving target to manage around, not a headline to react to. The providers that do that will be the ones who can offer stable promises to shippers while everyone else is still arguing about whether things are “back to normal.”