Q3 2025 Scorecard: Maersk, MSC, CMA CGM, COSCO and Hapag-Lloyd on Profit, Volume and Reliability

Ocean carriers have now published most of their Q3 2025 numbers.

On paper, volumes are up, but profits are sharply down. Freight rates have normalised, Red Sea diversions remain, and the new alliance structures are bedding in.

For freight forwarders and logistics service providers, this isn’t just “carrier financial news” – it’s the backdrop to your 2026 contracting, routing and risk decisions.

This post distils the latest Q3 2025 information on the top five container lines by capacity into a compact, LSP-focused view:

Who is financially under pressure?
Who is actually delivering reliability?
Where do you have negotiation leverage?
How should you adjust your carrier mix and contract strategy?

1. Market Snapshot: 2025 Is a Very Different Year to 2021–23

Demand vs. rates

Global container demand in 2025 is growing at roughly low-single-digit percentages (around 3–4% range), not collapsing.
Yet freight rates on major East–West trades are down double-digit percentages year-on-year compared with 2024 highs.
Net: the profit pool is shrinking fast even though ships are fuller than many expected.

Independent analyses (e.g. McCown-style liner indices and consultancy outlooks) show industry net profits more than halved between Q1 and Q2 2025, landing in the mid-single-digit USD billions – a far cry from the 2021–22 supercycle.

Red Sea & Cape diversions

Ongoing attacks in and around the Red Sea mean most mainline carriers still route Asia–Europe services via the Cape of Good Hope.
That adds roughly 10–14 days to typical Asia–North Europe voyages and thousands of extra nautical miles.
Fuel, insurance and re-routing add hundreds of thousands of dollars per round trip, absorbing a lot of effective capacity even as more ships are delivered.

Alliances reset & reliability step-change

Since February 2025, the East–West landscape is organised around:

Gemini Cooperation – Maersk + Hapag-Lloyd (hub-and-spoke, reliability-driven)
Ocean Alliance – CMA CGM, COSCO, OOCL, Evergreen (broad coverage)
Premier Alliance – ONE, HMM, Yang Ming (successor to THE Alliance)
MSC standalone – operating independently, with selective partnerships

Sea-Intelligence data through mid-2025 shows global schedule reliability stabilising in the mid-60% range, while Gemini’s East–West network is running close to 90% on-time on key corridors – a structural gap in service quality.

For LSPs, that reliability delta is often worth more than a few hundred dollars per FEU.

2. How to Use Carrier Financials as an LSP

Before diving into each carrier, it’s worth framing what these numbers are and are not:

They are not a “scorecard” for who to support.
They are indicators of:
Pricing pressure (margin squeeze vs. cost discipline)
How heavily each carrier is leaning on volume vs. value
Where reliability and product investments are being funded – or cut

When you read the summaries below, think in three lenses:

Reliability & network fit
Can this carrier reliably support your critical corridors in 2026?
Financial resilience
Is the carrier stable enough that you feel comfortable with longer commitments – or does prudence suggest diversification?
Strategic direction
Are they chasing low-yield volume, or building services your customers will actually pay for (visibility, reliability, decarbonisation, inland reach)?

3. Carrier-by-Carrier View: Q3 2025 Highlights

3.1 MSC – Global Reach, Private Numbers

Position & fleet

Largest global carrier by capacity: ~6.4m TEU, about 20% market share.
Fleet: roughly 889 vessels on mainline and feeder trades.
Operates independently since the end of 2M; no longer in a major East–West alliance.

Financials & transparency

Privately held and does not publish quarterly financials.
Industry estimates place annual revenue comfortably above USD 50bn, but there are no official Q3 2025 profit metrics.

Strategic themes

Aggressive fleet growth and network expansion over the last three years.
Significant investment in LNG-ready and alternative-fuel tonnage.
Runs a very broad port network with strong presence on Asia–Europe, Transpacific, and Latin America.

What this means for LSPs

Strengths
- Unmatched geographical coverage and frequency into secondary ports.
- Flexibility from operating its own network rather than alliance compromises.
Risks / watchpoints
- Less transparency on profitability and cost base than listed peers.
- Product offering can feel less standardised trade-by-trade compared with a tightly engineered network like Gemini.
Use case
- Excellent “workhorse” carrier for coverage, space and options, especially where you value port reach and weekly frequency more than top-tier schedule reliability.

3.2 Maersk – Reliability & Cost Discipline via Gemini

Position & fleet

#2 globally: ~4.5m TEU, ~14% share, ~735 vessels.
Co-founder of Gemini Cooperation with Hapag-Lloyd.

Q3 2025 financial snapshot

(USD, Maersk group)

Revenue: ~14.2bn (down from ~15.8bn in Q3 2024).
EBITDA: ~2.7bn
EBIT: ~1.3bn
Ocean EBIT: ~567m, up from ~229m in Q2, despite sharply lower freight rates.
Loaded Ocean volumes: +7% YoY, while average loaded freight rates down ~31% YoY on major trades.

The message: Maersk is restoring profitability via cost and network design, not via higher rates.

Operational performance

Gemini hub-and-spoke network on the main East–West corridors is now fully phased in.
Sea-Intelligence and NVOCC visibility tools show Gemini on-time performance near 90% on some Asia–Europe and Asia–US loops, versus global averages in the mid-60s.
Bunker consumption per container is down thanks to routing and slow-steaming optimisation; average bunker prices are also lower than 2024.

Strategic direction

Clear pivot from “pure Ocean” to integrated logistics, but Ocean reliability is still the foundation.
Energy transition: methanol dual-fuel fleet growing, with a 2040 net-zero target.
Terminals division delivered record volumes and EBIT in Q3, acting as a stabiliser.

Implications for LSPs

Where Maersk is strong for you
- Trades where schedule reliability is mission-critical (high-value, time-sensitive, or penalty-heavy cargo).
- Where customers want predictable, repeatable transit times more than the very lowest rate.
How to work with them
- Consider longer-term or multi-lane agreements when they can commit service levels and visibility SLAs.
- Use Maersk/Gemini as the “reliability spine” of your routing, and supplement with other carriers for flexibility and rate arbitrage.

3.3 CMA CGM – Profits Down, Scale and Logistics Up

Position & fleet

#3 globally: ~3.9m TEU, ~12–13% share, ~660+ vessels.
Member of Ocean Alliance.

Q3 2025 financial snapshot

(USD, CMA CGM Group – Q3 2025)

Revenue: ~14.0bn (-11.3% YoY)
EBITDA: ~3.0bn (down ~40.5% YoY)
EBITDA margin: ~21% (down from ~31% a year earlier)
Net income: ~749m (-~72% YoY)
Volumes: ~6.17m TEU, +2.3% YoY, +3.4% vs Q2

Segment view

Maritime transport
Revenue ~USD 9.0bn, -17.4% YoY.
EBITDA ~USD 2.2bn, margin ~25% (still strong, but almost halved vs 2024).
Logistics & air freight
Revenue modestly down mid-single-digits but still sizeable.
Terminals and other activities growing and helping diversify earnings.

Context & headwinds

Repeated tariff and trade policy shocks, especially US–China tensions, caused stop-start flows on some long-haul corridors.
Red Sea disruptions and Suez risk management continue to raise costs and complicate network planning.

Implications for LSPs

Strengths
- Very strong presence on Asia–Europe, Asia–Med, Intra-Asia and Africa.
- Integrated logistics platform through CEVA Logistics and Bolloré Logistics, useful for end-to-end solutions.
Risks / watchpoints
- Profitability is under heavy pressure even with good volumes.
- Network complexity across sea, air and logistics can make it harder to get a simple, lane-by-lane comparison.
Use case
- CMA CGM is attractive when you need end-to-end or multi-modal solutions in addition to ocean carriage, or where Ocean Alliance coverage complements Gemini/MSC gaps.

3.4 COSCO – State-Backed Scale, Margin Squeeze

Position & fleet

#4 globally: ~3.35m TEU, ~10–11% share, 500+ vessels.
Member of Ocean Alliance.
Strong state backing and deep integration into Belt & Road infrastructure and Chinese export flows.

Q3 & 9M 2025 financial snapshot

(CNY, COSCO Shipping Holdings – consolidated)

Q3 2025 revenue: ~CNY 58.5bn, down just over 20% YoY.
Q3 2025 net profit: ~CNY 9.5bn, down about 55% YoY.
9M 2025 revenue: ~CNY 167.6bn, down low-single-digits YoY.
9M 2025 net profit: ~CNY 27.1bn, down roughly 30% YoY.
Container volumes (9M): ~20.2m TEU, +6% YoY.

A key datapoint from COSCO’s commentary: the China Containerized Freight Index (CCFI) average was almost 40% lower YoY in Q3 2025, underlining how aggressively rates have reset.

Terminals & ports

COSCO Shipping Ports handled ~113m TEU in the first nine months, +5–6% YoY, showing port activity remains robust even as margins compress.

Implications for LSPs

Strengths
- Deep China origin footprint, strong on intra-Asia and Asia–Europe.
- Access to a large, integrated terminal ecosystem that can be helpful for congestion management in certain hubs.
Risks / watchpoints
- Heavy earnings sensitivity to China-centric trades and to overall rate levels.
- Financial pressure may increase focus on volume, with potential implications for product differentiation.
Use case
- Valuable in a diversified portfolio where Chinese export flows and Ocean Alliance strings are central to your book.
- Watch for service changes and blank sailings as they react to overcapacity and rate pressure.

3.5 Hapag-Lloyd – Volume Growth, Margin Compression

Position & fleet

#5 globally: ~2.35m TEU, ~7–8% share, ~300 vessels.
Now co-leader of Gemini Cooperation with Maersk.

Q3 & 9M 2025 financial snapshot

(EUR / USD, Hapag-Lloyd Group)

Q3 2025 (Liner segment)
EBITDA ~EUR 710m
EBIT ~EUR 180m+
9M 2025 (Group)
Revenue ~EUR 14.35bn, up ~2% YoY.
EBITDA ~EUR 2.5bn, down significantly vs 2024.
EBIT ~EUR 0.81bn, also down sharply from 2024.
Transport volume ~10.2m TEU, +9% YoY.
Average freight rate ~USD 1,397/TEU, -4.8% YoY.

So Hapag-Lloyd is moving more cargo at lower yields – classic overcapacity dynamics – while absorbing the costs of transitioning to the new Gemini network.

Operational & network points

Schedule reliability sits in the low-to-mid 70% range, only slightly below Maersk and well above many peers.
Strong franchises in Transatlantic, Latin America and North–South trades, plus Gemini East–West.

Implications for LSPs

Strengths
- Very solid operational standards, especially on Transatlantic and Latin America.
- Gemini connection gives you access to a tightly engineered East–West network without relying solely on Maersk.
Risks / watchpoints
- Margin pressure and network start-up costs will keep management focused on cost cutting through 2026.
- Some short-term schedule adjustments are still possible as Gemini fine-tunes rotations and hubs.
Use case
- Good partner where you need Gemini reliability plus Hapag’s strong regional positions – and where your customers value German-style transparency and documentation.

4. Quick KPI Comparison (High-Level)

Q3 2025 – Top 5 Snapshot (Approximate)
(All numbers rounded and simplified for comparison; see carrier reports for exact figures.)

Carrier	Size / Share	Q3 Revenue	Profitability Trend vs Q3 2024	Volume Trend YoY	Reliability / Network Notes
MSC	~6.4m TEU, ~20% share	Not disclosed	Not disclosed (private)	Growing fleet	Independent network, broadest global coverage
Maersk	~4.5m TEU, ~14% share	~USD 14.2bn	EBIT down YoY, up vs Q2	+7%	Gemini near 90% on-time on key East–West
CMA CGM	~3.9m TEU, ~13% share	~USD 14.0bn	EBITDA -40% YoY	+2–3%	Ocean Alliance; heavy logistics and terminals play
COSCO	~3.35m TEU, ~11% share	~CNY 58.5bn (Q3)	Net profit -55% YoY	+6% (9M)	Strong China/Belt & Road exposure
Hapag-Lloyd	~2.35m TEU, ~7–8% share	~EUR 4.7bn (Q3)	Profit roughly halved 9M	+9% (9M)	Gemini member; strong Transatlantic & LatAm

5. What This Means for Freight Forwarders & LSPs

5.1 Profitability is under real pressure

Across Maersk, CMA CGM, COSCO and Hapag-Lloyd, the pattern is the same:

Volumes are up.
Freight rates are down.
Profits are down sharply.

Carriers are not in a 2016-style crisis, but they are far from the 2021–22 boom. That matters because:

You should expect continued competition on price, especially on commoditised lanes.
At the same time, carriers will try to protect premium, reliability-led products and may be less willing to discount those.

5.2 Reliability is now a differentiator, not a commodity

Gemini’s near-90% schedule reliability on key East–West corridors is a structural change. In a world where Red Sea diversions and weather disruptions are “the new normal”:

It is rational for shippers and LSPs to pay a reasonable premium for predictable transit times on critical lanes.
For less time-sensitive routes, you can still harvest value from overcapacity via other alliances and carriers.

5.3 Rate environment is favourable – but don’t assume it lasts

With a large newbuilding pipeline delivering through 2026 and Cape diversions soaking up some of that capacity, the medium-term picture looks like:

Persistent overcapacity on most main trades.
Low–to-moderate rates, punctuated by short-term spikes from route disruptions or port congestion.

It’s a good moment to:

Lock in structural value (not just low spot rates) via contracts that include:
Volume flexibility bands
Explicit reliability or roll-over clauses
Detention/demurrage frameworks that you can pass through to customers

5.4 Alliance structures: use them intentionally

With 2M gone and Gemini launched, you now effectively have three standardised East–West “products” plus MSC:

Use Gemini (Maersk + Hapag-Lloyd) for lanes where reliability is your key selling point.
Use Ocean Alliance (CMA CGM, COSCO, OOCL, Evergreen) to balance exposure, especially on Asia–Europe and Asia–Med.
Use Premier Alliance (ONE, HMM, Yang Ming) selectively where their strings and port pairs match specific customer needs.
Use MSC for global reach and frequency, especially where port coverage or feeder connectivity matter most.

A deliberate multi-carrier, multi-alliance portfolio is now standard risk management, not a nice-to-have.

5.5 Sustainability & fuel transition: long-term, not cosmetic

Maersk, CMA CGM and Hapag-Lloyd in particular are:

Ordering large numbers of methanol or LNG dual-fuel vessels.
Signing green methanol and alternative fuel offtake agreements.
Preparing for stricter regional regimes (EU ETS, FuelEU Maritime, etc.).

For LSPs:

These investments will increasingly show up as fuel or “green service” surcharges.
Some shippers – especially in automotive, electronics and retail – are now explicitly asking which carriers are used for emissions reporting.

Being able to explain the differences between carriers’ decarbonisation paths will become part of your commercial value in 2026–27.

6. Practical Takeaways for 2026 Contracting

To turn this into action:

Segment your customers by sensitivity

Identify which accounts are time-critical vs. cost-critical vs. sustainability-critical.
Map them to appropriate carrier mixes (e.g. Gemini-heavy vs. Ocean-heavy vs. MSC-heavy).

Build a “core + flex” carrier portfolio

2–3 core carriers per main trade for stability and allocation.
1–2 flex carriers for opportunistic or spot-driven moves.

Use the current low-margin environment to negotiate more than price

Timely roll-over rules.
Data sharing (milestone visibility, exception alerts).
Joint quarterly performance reviews.

Watch leading indicators, not just P&L

Schedule reliability stats by carrier and lane.
Blank sailing announcements and service changes.
Terminal performance at your critical hubs.

Prepare a simple narrative for your own customers

Many shippers see headlines about “carrier profits collapsing” and assume rates will keep falling.
A clear, fact-based explanation of why you recommend certain carriers and contract structures will differentiate your sales and account management.

Carrier mix is only as strong as your visibility. If you want to turn Q3 performance insights into lane-level, carrier-level decisions for your own network, TRADLINX can help you build that reliability scorecard from actual container events—not guesswork.