Key Takeaways

1. Logistics hubs are becoming strategic targets.

   Attacks on Wildberries and Ozon show how disruptions at major distribution centers can affect entire networks of sellers and customers.

2. Maritime chokepoints can disrupt trade far beyond the conflict zone.

   The Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz crises have driven up freight costs, disrupted shipping schedules, and spread congestion to major transshipment hubs.

3. Efficiency can create vulnerabilities.

   Concentrating cargo, operations, and IT systems in a few critical locations can turn those facilities into single points of failure.

4. Supply chain resilience starts with knowing where the risks are.

   Identifying critical hubs, preparing alternative routes, and tracking changes to shipments can help businesses respond faster when disruptions occur.

On July 18, 2026, drones struck two major logistics centers in Elektrostal, near Moscow, and Kotovsk, in Russia’s Tambov region. Neither was a military factory or an oil refinery. Both were warehouses operated by Wildberries, Russia’s largest e-commerce company, where orders were stored and shipped to customers across the country.

The attacks continued for more than a month. On August 22, Ozon, Russia’s second-largest e-commerce company, was hit as well. The country’s two biggest online retailers had both seen their distribution centers go up in flames.

When businesses think about supply chain risk, supplier bankruptcies and raw material prices usually come to mind first. But these attacks targeted something different: the logistics hubs where goods come together before moving on to their destinations.

And warehouses aren’t the only targets. Ports, shipping lanes, and even the IT systems that run cargo terminals have come under attack, sometimes bringing entire operations to a halt.

Why are logistics hubs being targeted in the first place?

Russia’s Two Biggest E-Commerce Companies Come Under Attack

Wildberries is often called the “Amazon of Russia.” In 2025, its gross merchandise value (GMV) reached 6.1 trillion rubles (approximately $73 billion), up 49% from the previous year. The company handles more than 20 million orders a day through a network of over 200 logistics facilities with roughly 5.2 million square meters of warehouse space.

More than one million merchants sold through Wildberries as of the end of 2024, and over 85% were small and medium-sized businesses. Their ability to sell and deliver goods depends heavily on Wildberries’ distribution network. When that network is disrupted, the consequences reach those sellers too.

The first attack, on July 18, killed eight people and injured more than 70. It also disrupted approximately 7% of Wildberries’ logistics capacity. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy claimed the warehouses were being used to supply sanctioned drone components and navigation equipment to Russian forces. Russia described the strikes as acts of terrorism.

Subsequent strikes hit some of the company’s largest distribution hubs. Within three weeks, eight of its 15 major hubs had temporarily shut down. On August 16, a fire hit the Koledino complex, Wildberries’ largest warehouse, which supported one- to two-day delivery across the Moscow region.

Estimates of the damage vary. Some measure lost logistics throughput, while others measure affected warehouse space. The figures aren’t directly interchangeable, but they point to the same scale of disruption: within a month, nearly half of Wildberries’ warehouse capacity had been affected.

The losses extended well beyond the damaged buildings. Wildberries founder and CEO Tatyana Kim said businesses in 10 countries had suffered substantial losses. Market research firm Data Insight estimated losses among Wildberries sellers at 445 billion to 507 billion rubles.

Attacks on a handful of warehouses had disrupted not just one company’s operations, but thousands of merchants’ sales and deliveries throughout the Moscow region.

Ozon was next. As of the end of 2025, Russia’s second-largest e-commerce company operated approximately 5 million square meters of logistics infrastructure across Russia and other former Soviet states.

The attacks began at its Samara distribution center on August 22. Six facilities were hit within two days, including a center in Makhachkala, Dagestan, that caught fire and suspended operations. Further strikes followed in Ufa and Orenburg on August 27 and Saratov on September 10.

By September 11, seven Ozon logistics centers had been damaged or destroyed. The company’s 100,000-square-meter warehouse in Saratov was completely destroyed by fire.

Data Insight estimated Ozon’s direct losses at 30 billion to 62.5 billion rubles, with another 88.5 billion to 107 billion rubles in losses for its sellers. Ozon shares fell as much as 12% during trading on the Moscow Exchange.

Why Logistics Hubs Are Targets: They Keep the Economy Moving

Why would warehouses belonging to Wildberries and Ozon become targets in a war?

The Moscow Times described the attacks as a new phase in Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign. The apparent aim was twofold: weaken Russia’s ability to sustain its war effort and disrupt civilian life enough for ordinary Russians to feel the effects of the conflict.

But attacks on logistics infrastructure have been part of the Russia-Ukraine war for years.

After withdrawing from the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023, Russia attacked Ukrainian ports eight times in a single month. The strikes destroyed 270,000 metric tons of grain, sending repercussions through international grain markets.

Russia has also repeatedly struck terminals operated by Nova Poshta, Ukraine’s largest private parcel delivery company. On July 31, 2026, a sorting terminal in Poltava was completely destroyed.

Ukraine, for its part, had targeted Russian export infrastructure before the Wildberries and Ozon strikes.

In November 2025, Ukrainian naval drones disabled a Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) Black Sea terminal near Novorossiysk. The facility handles more than 1% of the world’s oil supply. Its shutdown disrupted crude oil exports from Kazakhstan, even though Kazakhstan was not a party to the conflict.

There is a strategic reason both sides have gone after logistics infrastructure.

In this war, keeping the economy running has become nearly as important as maintaining military strength. Disrupting an opponent’s economy also weakens its ability to sustain the war.

And economies depend on the movement of goods. Logistics hubs are where those movements converge.

A major distribution center does more than store inventory. It brings together shipment data, IT systems, logistics providers, and the decisions that keep goods moving. Shut down that center, and the consequences can spread to suppliers, sellers, and consumers.

This changes how the strategic value of a logistics facility is understood. What matters isn’t just what a site produces, but how much economic activity depends on it.

Some civilian logistics facilities have become important enough to be considered strategic assets on par with infrastructure traditionally regarded as critical to military operations.

Red Sea and Hormuz Disruptions Spread Through Freight Rates and Transshipment Networks

Not every logistics chokepoint is on land.

More than 80% of global trade by volume moves by sea, and some of the busiest shipping routes pass through narrow stretches of water. The Red Sea, which leads to the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Hormuz, the gateway to the Persian Gulf, are two of the most important.

When one of these passages becomes inaccessible, the disruption reaches far beyond a single facility. Entire shipping routes can be cut off.

The Red Sea has been a case in point for nearly three years.

Since Houthi forces in Yemen began attacking commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden in November 2023, attacks and vessel seizures had reached 99 incidents by early 2026.

Ocean carriers responded by sending ships around the Cape of Good Hope rather than risk passage through the Red Sea. That added one to two weeks to each voyage. Carriers and shippers had to absorb higher transportation costs and longer lead times while reworking procurement plans.

Traffic through the Suez Canal fell sharply. According to BIMCO, the combined deadweight tonnage of vessels transiting the canal in 2025 was 57% to 64% below its 2023 level. The decline for container ships reached 86% in the fourth quarter.

Houthi attacks briefly eased after the Gaza ceasefire in October 2025, but resumed in July 2026. After the group declared a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia, attacks on Saudi-linked vessels continued.

The Strait of Hormuz faced a more severe disruption: the passage itself was effectively closed.

When war broke out between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other on February 28, 2026, traffic through the strait was effectively blocked.

Major carriers, including Maersk, MSC, Hapag-Lloyd, and CMA CGM, suspended transits. According to Alphaliner, 138 container ships with a combined capacity of approximately 470,000 TEU were stranded inside the Persian Gulf as of March 2.

The effects soon reached beyond the Gulf, moving through freight rates and transshipment networks.

Spot freight rates from Shanghai to Jebel Ali climbed from less than $2,000 before the crisis to more than $8,000, roughly four times their previous level. Hapag-Lloyd imposed Middle East emergency surcharges ranging from $300 to $7,200 per container, depending on the route.

Jebel Ali, the Middle East’s largest port, is a major connecting point for regional trade. Transshipment cargo accounts for approximately 65% of its throughput, including re-export flows. When operations there are disrupted, the impact extends well beyond the United Arab Emirates.

The scale of that disruption was evident in the second quarter of 2026, when Jebel Ali’s cargo throughput fell 90.1% year over year.

Congestion at Middle Eastern ports also spread to Asian transshipment hubs, including Singapore, Port Klang, and Tanjung Pelepas. All three handle US-bound cargo as well.

The Strait of Hormuz remains under threat. Attacks surged again in October.

On October 13, the Singapore-flagged container ship GFS Pride was struck and sank while passing through the strait. One Indian crew member was killed.

These disruptions have much in common with the warehouse attacks in Russia.

A single chokepoint supports the operations of countless businesses. When it becomes unavailable, the effects can spread quickly from manufacturers to distributors, e-commerce companies, and consumers.

Attacks using drones and missiles to block one stretch of water can disrupt shipping far beyond the conflict zone.

How a Single Parcel or Cyberattack Can Shut Down a Logistics Hub

Drones and missiles aren’t the only ways to bring logistics operations to a standstill.

In July 2024, a single parcel caught fire at DHL’s Leipzig hub in Germany, burning an entire cargo container.

The package had been sent from one of the Baltic states and was due to pass through Leipzig, a major DHL air cargo hub, before reaching its final recipient.

That same month, another parcel ignited at a DHL warehouse near Birmingham, England.

Western security officials suspected the incidents were connected to a Russian intelligence operation intended to start fires aboard cargo planes bound for North America. The Kremlin denied the allegations, calling them baseless fabrications.

The attackers didn’t need to get anywhere near the hub. They only had to send a package. The logistics network carried it the rest of the way.

An attack on the IT systems behind that network doesn’t even require a physical package.

In 2017, NotPetya malware spread through a compromised update to Ukrainian accounting software. The attack wasn’t specifically aimed at Maersk, but it reached the carrier’s network and disrupted operations at 76 port terminals worldwide. Maersk estimated its losses at $200 million to $300 million.

Entire ports have also been brought to a standstill.

In July 2023, ransomware infected the integrated IT system controlling every container terminal at Japan’s Port of Nagoya. Although the port handles approximately 10% of Japan’s trade, container operations stopped for more than two days.

Four months later, in November, DP World Australia, which handles roughly 40% of Australia’s cargo, suffered a cyberattack. The company disconnected its terminals in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, and Fremantle from the internet. During the shutdown, approximately 30,000 containers were left stranded.

All three cyber incidents exposed the same vulnerability. Terminal operations depended on centralized IT systems. The cranes and berths were still there, but without the systems needed to run them, cargo couldn’t move.

How Decades of Supply Chain Optimization Created Single Points of Failure

Why have so many critical logistics functions become concentrated in a handful of locations and systems?

Much of the answer lies in how companies have managed their supply chains over the past 30 years.

The goal was efficiency. Businesses reduced inventory, consolidated freight volumes, and sourced from the lowest-cost suppliers. They automated operations and shortened delivery cycles. Those gains helped large retailers build e-commerce networks capable of processing millions of orders a day.

But concentrating so much activity in a few places comes with a trade-off.

The more volume and functionality a company concentrates in one location, the more it stands to lose if that location goes offline. A facility that makes the network efficient can also become its single point of failure.

The March 2021 Suez Canal blockage and the semiconductor shortages during the COVID-19 pandemic offered early warnings.

The recent incidents follow the same pattern.

Wildberries’ Koledino warehouse supported one- to two-day deliveries across the Moscow region. The Strait of Hormuz is the only maritime passage connecting the Persian Gulf to the open sea. At the Port of Nagoya, a single integrated IT system controlled every container terminal.

In each case, a much larger network depended on one critical point.

A supply chain built for maximum efficiency isn’t necessarily built to withstand disruption.

Supply Chain Risk Management: Spread the Risk and Identify Critical Hubs

So how can companies reduce the risks created by concentrated logistics networks?

One approach is to distribute operations across more locations and establish alternative routes.

Amazon offers an example.

The company built a vast logistics network capable of delivering more than 13 billion items worldwide through same-day or next-day service in 2025.

Even with that scale, Amazon has been moving inventory closer to customers to reduce its exposure to disruptions in individual regions. In 2025, it expanded same-day and next-day delivery to more than 4,000 smaller cities, towns, and rural communities across the United States.

Other companies are making similar adjustments.

Wildberries is shifting part of its logistics capacity outside Russia. In Kazakhstan, it is building a warehouse of approximately 260,000 square meters, with operations scheduled to begin in the first quarter of 2027.

Nova Poshta, meanwhile, has kept deliveries running by activating backup logistics routes whenever its terminals come under attack.

Supply chains are no longer judged on cost and speed alone. Resilience matters too: the ability to absorb disruptions, reorganize operations, and keep the business running even if a single logistics hub shuts down.

That doesn’t mean every logistics hub is a target, or that companies should fortify their supply chains like military bases. But some facilities have become as vital to economic activity as other critical infrastructure. Companies need to identify those hubs first and prepare for potential disruptions.

Not every vulnerability can be eliminated. The goal is to prevent a single point of failure from bringing down the entire business. The focus of supply chain management is also shifting from network optimization toward building networks that can withstand disruption.

To assess logistics hubs as part of supply chain risk management, companies can start with these five questions:

1. Which assets could we lose for only a few weeks before the entire supply chain starts to break down? Major distribution centers will almost certainly be on that list.
2. When choosing warehouse locations, are we looking beyond real estate costs, customer proximity, and labor availability? Geopolitical exposure, infrastructure reliability, and the ability to maintain operations during a crisis also need to be considered.
3. How much freight is concentrated at each facility, and how vulnerable are the digital systems those facilities depend on?
4. If a shipping corridor, port, or transshipment hub on our routes becomes inaccessible, do we know which shipments would be affected?
5. Do we have alternative facilities and routes that would allow the business to continue operating if one location went offline?

For Ocean Shippers, Supply Chain Risk Starts with Knowing Where Cargo Is

For shippers and freight forwarders handling ocean cargo, the fourth question deserves particular attention.

The Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz disruptions show how quickly a blocked shipping route can affect freight rates, transshipment operations, and arrival schedules at the same time.

When that happens, two questions need immediate answers.

Which vessel is carrying the shipment, and which transshipment ports is it moving through?

How far has its estimated time of arrival (ETA) shifted?

Those answers can be difficult to pull together when shipments are spread across multiple ocean carriers. Checking each carrier’s tracking system takes time, and delays in getting that information can slow down procurement adjustments and customer updates.

Tradlinx Ocean Visibility brings shipments from multiple carriers into one place, giving teams a way to monitor vessel positions, transshipment activity, and ETA changes without checking each carrier separately.

With logistics infrastructure increasingly exposed to deliberate attacks, no supply chain can be completely insulated from disruption.

But companies that know which chokepoints their cargo depends on—and can spot changes to those shipments quickly—are better positioned to limit the damage.

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