Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is still running at a fraction of its pre-war level. The five-day average fell to about 10 crossings a day in mid-August, against more than 130 before the war. The latest weekend hardly changed the picture: Reuters counted 16 commodity vessels crossing on 21 August, 13 on 22 August and just four on 23 August.
Low traffic is only half the problem. By the final week of the 60-day US-Iran memorandum of understanding, 66% of crude clearance could not be traced back to a confirmed loading terminal. On a separate measure, more than 80% of Hormuz crossings were classified as Dark or Unknown by route.
For anyone quoting, booking or insuring Gulf cargo, those numbers need to be read together. Far fewer vessels are moving through the strait, while much of the remaining movement has become harder to identify.
What the Transit Counts Show
| Period | What was measured | Count | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-war baseline | Daily crossings, all vessel types | More than 130/day | Kpler, reported by CNBC |
| Mid-August | Five-day average, all vessel types | About 10/day | Kpler, reported by CNBC |
| 21 August | Commodity-vessel crossings | 16 | Kpler, reported by Reuters |
| 22 August | Commodity-vessel crossings | 13 | Kpler, reported by Reuters |
| 23 August | Commodity-vessel crossings | 4 | Kpler, reported by Reuters |
The five-day average covers all vessel types; Reuters’ daily figures cover commodity vessels visible in tracking data. Ships running without visible AIS signals may not appear in observed counts.
The five-day average near 10 was more than 90% below the pre-war baseline. The latest sequence of 16, 13 and four commodity vessels also shows why a single day’s count is a poor recovery signal: traffic can jump from one day to the next while remaining far below normal.
The wider flow data tell a similar story. Crude clearance out of the Mideast Gulf averaged 6.1 million barrels per day across the 60-day MoU window, nearly three times the roughly 2.3 million barrels per day achieved during the blockaded period before it, but still only around 40% of the roughly 15 million barrels per day Hormuz averaged in 2025.
The MoU cleared much of the backlog without restoring normal flow.
The Remaining Traffic Became Much Harder to Identify
The sharper change across the 60-day window was not simply how many vessels crossed Hormuz. It was how much of the remaining movement could still be identified with confidence.
Two measures show the deterioration. Cargo attribution tracks whether crude appearing outside the Gulf can be traced back to the terminal that loaded it. Route classification tracks whether a Hormuz crossing can be assigned to a confirmed transit route.
| Measure | Earlier / reference point | What changed |
|---|---|---|
| Crude clearance, Mideast Gulf | About 2.3 mbd during the blockaded period before the MoU | 6.1 mbd average across the 60-day window |
| Idle floating storage of crude | 61 mb at signing | 16 mb within three weeks |
| Total crude on water in the Gulf system | 165 mb at signing | About 130 mb on 16 August |
| Clearance with no confirmed loading terminal | About 28% before the MoU; fell to 5% in week 3 | 66% in the expiry week |
| Dark/Unknown share of crossing routes | Never below 44% during the window | Above 80% at the close |
| Iranian crude loadings | 893 kbd in July | 156 kbd through 17 August |
Figures in this section are drawn from Kpler data published on 19 August 2026. The reference periods differ because the measures describe different parts of the 60-day window. Terminal attribution and Dark/Unknown route classification are separate measures.
In the third week of the MoU, 95% of barrels leaving the Gulf could be traced to the terminal that loaded them. By the final week, only 34% could. The remaining 66% had no confirmed upstream loading terminal.
Route visibility deteriorated at the same time. The southern Omani corridor opened under Joint Maritime Information Center guidance on 20 June and peaked at 48 crossings in week 2. By week 4, Kpler assessed it as effectively gone after attacks on vessels using the route. The IMO route fell to zero from week 5.
By the end of the window, more than four-fifths of crossings sat in the Dark/Unknown category, while the remaining identifiable traffic was concentrated heavily on a fading Iranian route.
The change crossed cargo types as well. LPG crossings fell to zero in mid-July. LNG carriers stopped crossing for almost three weeks before returning in late July with their movements dark.
For operators, low traffic is only half the problem. When route identification also deteriorates, even a rise in crossings becomes a weaker signal that normal service is returning.
If your Gulf-exposed bookings now depend on transshipment calls and inland handoffs you did not plan for, walk through how ops teams hold container-level milestones together across those legs.
Iran Is Tightening Its Own Rules for Passage
The 60-day MoU expired on 17 August without a peace agreement or extension. Direct US-Iran talks have not resumed, although regional mediation continues.
Tehran declared the MoU nullified on expiry day and asserted mandatory transit permits and maritime environmental tolls over the strait. Washington rejects Iran’s authority to impose those requirements and has continued its own blockade and naval operations.
Iran has now made that passage regime more concrete. On 24 August, its Persian Gulf Strait Authority said it had blacklisted 45 tankers for violating Iranian transit rules. The named vessels could face fines, detention or cargo confiscation.
The warning also reaches beyond those 45 ships. Iran said vessels conducting ship-to-ship transfers with blacklisted vessels could themselves be added to the restricted list. The list includes crude, LNG, LPG and product tankers, including vessels linked to major Gulf and international operators.
At the same time, passage remains selective rather than completely closed. Reuters reported on 22 August that Iran had granted permission for a number of Iraqi oil tankers to transit Hormuz after repeated requests from Baghdad.
Taken together, the two developments show the problem for operators: some vessels can still secure passage, while Iran is building a system that can attach penalties to vessels, cargoes and even subsequent ship-to-ship activity.
US Widens Secondary-Sanctions Risk Around Iranian Shipping
Washington added another layer on 24 August. The US broadened the activities that can expose foreign parties to secondary sanctions across five Iranian sectors, including shipping, aviation, technology, gold and digital assets. Treasury also announced sanctions on 60 individuals, entities and vessels.
The move increases the risk beyond companies already appearing on US sanctions lists. Foreign businesses that continue supporting sanctionable activity in the targeted Iranian sectors can themselves face restrictions on access to the US financial system.
Treasury did not immediately impose the toughest threatened penalties on major foreign financial institutions, and Chinese banks suspected of facilitating Iranian oil trade were absent from the initial list. Secretary Scott Bessent said affected parties would receive a “cure period,” but did not give a firm timetable for wider penalties.
For shipping teams, the practical effect is a wider screening problem. Iran-linked bookings now warrant another check across the vessel, owner, operator, manager, bank, insurer and payment chain—not only for newly designated names, but for activity that may fall within the broader secondary-sanctions framework.
What to Re-Check on Gulf-Exposed Bookings
- Use a rolling traffic trend rather than one day’s crossing count. Daily traffic can move sharply while the wider route remains heavily constrained.
- Track visibility alongside volume. More crossings are a weaker recovery signal if the Dark/Unknown share remains high or terminal attribution stays poor.
- Re-screen Iran-linked counterparties after the 24 August US action. Check the vessel and ownership chain alongside banks, insurers, agents and other service providers exposed to the booking.
- Treat Iranian permit, toll or passage-related payment demands as a sanctions issue, not an ordinary surcharge. OFAC has warned that toll payments, safe-passage arrangements and the disclosure of sensitive vessel information can create sanctions exposure. Escalate these demands before payment or reimbursement.
- Review war-risk terms against the post-17 August environment. Check whether premiums, exclusions, routing requirements or other conditions have changed since the MoU expired.
- Look for commercial evidence of reopening. Sustained traffic growth, lower Dark/Unknown shares and restored direct Gulf calls are stronger signals than a temporary rise in daily crossings.
Our earlier analysis of why Jebel Ali’s throughput collapsed 90.1% while the terminal stayed fully operational showed the downstream effect of disrupted Gulf routing.
The Hormuz numbers show the upstream condition. Traffic remains far below normal, most crossings at the end of the MoU window could no longer be assigned to a confirmed route, and both Iran and the US are adding new rules around the vessels and counterparties that continue to move through the region.
Further Reading
- 60 days of a broken US-Iran MoU: the market stopped waiting for Hormuz — Kpler
- Ships passing through Hormuz hover in single digits, data shows — Reuters
- Iran grants permission for a number of Iraqi oil tankers to pass through Hormuz — Reuters
- Economic Fury Targets Iranian Maritime Extortion — U.S. Treasury
- Treasury Disrupts Iranian Regime’s Strait of Hormuz Extortion Network — U.S. Treasury
Data note: Transit counts use different vessel populations and may exclude ships operating without visible AIS signals. Kpler’s warning that recent figures can revise 1.5 to 2 times higher applies to crude and condensate clearance and loading volumes, not vessel-crossing counts. Terminal attribution and Dark/Unknown route classification are separate measures.
Sanctions note: OFAC has warned that complying with Iranian demands for safe passage, maritime services or toll payments—and providing sensitive vessel information—can create sanctions exposure. Iran’s own vessel restrictions and US sanctions can change on short notice. Confirm current sanctions guidance, carrier advisories and insurer terms before acting on a passage-related demand.
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