Delays Are Absorbing 1.7m TEU. Why Nominal Capacity Is Misleading Shippers

About 5% of global container fleet capacity is currently being absorbed by vessel delays. In effective-supply terms, that is roughly 1.7m TEU—approaching the size of Evergreen’s entire fleet. Sea-Intelligence’s latest analysis puts the excess above the historical 2011 to 2019 baseline at about 1m TEU, close to the size of HMM’s fleet.

The planning-relevant part is how persistent that gap has become. Using Global Liner Performance data through March 2026, Sea-Intelligence calculated that delay absorption averaged 5.3% across 2023 to 2026, equivalent to about 1.8m TEU. The latest June reading is still about 5%, or 1.7m TEU. The current figure is therefore not an isolated disruption peak. It sits close to a multi-year average that is more than twice the pre-pandemic baseline.

Period	Fleet capacity absorbed by delays	Equivalent volume	Above the 2.2% baseline
2011 to 2019	2.2% (±0.5)	Structural baseline	Baseline
January 2022 (pandemic peak)	13.8%	Not stated	11.6 points*
2023 to 2026 average	5.3%	About 1.8m TEU	3.1 points
June 2026	About 5%	About 1.7m TEU	2.8 points (about 1m TEU)

Share of global container fleet capacity effectively absorbed by vessel delays, per Sea-Intelligence. The 2023 to 2026 average and the 2011 to 2019 baseline are from Sunday Spotlight issue 762, using Global Liner Performance data through March 2026. The June 2026 figures are from the latest Global Liner Performance analysis. *The January 2022 figure is shown against Sea-Intelligence’s subsequently calculated 2.2% historical baseline.

What Sits Behind the 5%

The absorption figure has two inputs: the share of arrivals that run late, and how far behind the late ones actually arrive. Both have to be read together, because a market with fewer late ships that are later when they slip can absorb the same effective capacity as a market with more, milder delays.

Schedule reliability. Global reliability came in at 62.6% for June 2026, down 1.9 percentage points from May and 4.7 points from June 2025. Before the pandemic, carriers typically ran somewhere between 70% and 80%.

Delay length. The average delay for arrivals already classified as late was 5.31 days in June, which was an improvement of 0.34 days on May. A late vessel in the pre-pandemic years typically arrived three to four days behind schedule.

The two inputs moved in opposite directions in June. Reliability fell 1.9 percentage points from May, although 62.6% was still the second-highest monthly reading of 2026. Average delay for late arrivals improved by 0.34 days. Even with that improvement in delay duration, effective capacity absorption remained around 5%, close to the 5.3% average Sea-Intelligence calculated across 2023 to 2026 and well above the old 2.2% baseline.

More Ships Have Not Closed the Gap

Asian yards have delivered a large volume of new tonnage in recent years, which makes persistent pressure on effective capacity look counterintuitive. The distinction is between nominal fleet size and how productively that fleet can circulate. A vessel delayed in a rotation still counts toward deployed fleet capacity, but a longer cycle means the same vessel completes fewer rotations over a given period. Sea-Intelligence estimates that the resulting loss currently equates to capacity equivalent to roughly one TEU in twenty of the global fleet.

Carriers are describing related pressure from the landside. Maersk raised its full-year 2026 earnings guidance on 13 August, lifting expected underlying EBITDA to a range of US$10.5bn to US$12.5bn from US$8bn to US$10bn, on an assumption of around 4% global container market volume growth. In the results statement, chief executive Vincent Clerc pointed to broad-based Far East demand since 2024 producing more unbalanced trade flows, at volumes that are challenging landside infrastructure capacity. Maersk described increased congestion and disruption across ports and inland transportation as that infrastructure comes under pressure.

For an operations team, the distinction matters. Nominal deployed capacity and effective carrying capacity are not the same number. When vessels take longer to complete their rotations, some of the capacity that appears in fleet totals is effectively absorbed by the delay.

With roughly 1m TEU more effective capacity being absorbed by delays than under the historical baseline, that loss of effective supply can add to capacity pressure, particularly where congestion is already constraining individual services. Walk through how ops teams catch a rolled booking from container events rather than from a carrier email.

Planning Against a Persistent Gap

Do not treat the 2.8 points above baseline as a one-off disruption. The pre-pandemic baseline was 2.2%. Across 2023 to 2026, Sea-Intelligence calculates an average of 5.3%, and the June reading remains around 5%. That persistence makes it reasonable to treat delay absorption as a capacity-planning factor rather than assume it will disappear with the next round of vessel deliveries.

Do not apply a flat 5% haircut to every lane. The figure is a global equivalent-capacity calculation, not a statement that every trade has 5% less bookable space. Nominal deployed tonnage overstates effective capacity at the global level by roughly the amount represented by delay absorption, but the effect on an individual lane can be much larger or smaller.

Keep the delay average out of your buffer arithmetic. The 5.31-day figure applies only to arrivals already classified as late, so it describes neither the average shipment nor the tail an inventory plan has to survive. We set out the reasons the published reliability numbers resist direct use in our comparison of the two main schedule reliability benchmarks, including why figures from different providers cannot be spliced together.

Watch your own load and discharge ports. The absorbed capacity is a global aggregate, and it lands unevenly. Berth queues and disruption at the specific terminals in your rotation determine how much pressure reaches your bookings, which a worldwide percentage cannot tell you.

Re-check space commitments before peak windows. The June figure offers little evidence that the long-running excess over the historical baseline has disappeared. Instead of assuming nominal fleet growth will automatically translate into additional bookable capacity, check the services and ports your cargo actually depends on.

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